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Nashi, at the same time, prepared another plan to strengthen its grip on Russian civil society. At the core of this new development was Stal, a subdivision of Nashi that was in charge of organizing street protests. “Stal” not only means “steel” in Russian, but it has the additional advantage that it evokes the name of Russia’s “man of steel,” Joseph Stalin. According to Le Monde’s Moscow correspondent Marie Jégo, “the group Stal . . . has just endorsed the theses of Joseph Goebbels, the minister of propaganda of the Hitler regime. The militants of Stal are asked to know them by heart.”^[37] It is not surprising, therefore, that the leader of Stal, Nadezhda Tarasenko, proudly declared that “one thousand activists in my movement are not afraid of using tough methods to stop America’s influence on Russia.”^[38] Tough methods? Yes, because the movement was still considered too soft for its masters in the Kremlin. While Nashi was used for pro-Kremlin rallies, Stal was used as Nashi’s “tough vanguard.” Before, such tough actions had often been outsourced by Nashi to external groups. In August 2005, for instance, violent members of the Spartak soccer fan club The Gladiators attacked leftists of the National Bolsheviks in Moscow with stun guns and baseball bats, after which four of their victims had to be hospitalized. A Gladiators member told the paper Kommersant that “the Gladiators work closely with Nashi and provide security for their events.” He added that “the guys receive $400–$600 for their services.”^[39] This kind of outsourcing of violence seemed to be happening with more frequency. However, the leaders of Nashi were also determined to set up a pool of fighters inside their organization. Stal was one of them. When, for instance, on December 6, 2011, opposition rallies were organized in Moscow to protest against the rigged Duma elections, a counterdemonstration was organized by Stal, backed by 50,000 police and 11,500 Interior Ministry troops.^[40] However, the rank and file of Nashi was more difficult to mobilize. Nashi members attending a second demonstration for Putin, organized on December 12, 2011, had to be paid.^[41]

A second subdivision of Nashi that was to contribute to its planned transformation into a tough organization was the DMD (Dobrovolnye molodezhnye druzhiny). These “volunteer youth squads” were led by Roman Verbitsky. This Nashi section had the task of providing volunteers to help the local police in keeping order. In March 2008 Verbitsky declared that “the voluntary youth squads operate in 19 regions and comprise 5–6 thousand people. Their main activity is patrolling the streets together with law enforcement authorities.”^[42] This organization was intended to become the core of a new, federation-wide system of volunteer squads which in three years would become a force that would be present in more than half of Russia’s regions and comprise at least a hundred thousand volunteers.^[43] As the godfathers of this new, ambitious project, Vladislav Surkov and Vasily Yakemenko were again mentioned. Both Kremlin confidants would have taken the initiative during the 2009 Nashi summer camp.

Orthodox Battle Groups?