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It is telling that Putin defined patriotism as the “endeavor to make one’s country more beautiful, richer, more powerful, happier”—as if happiness can be attributed to a country instead of being the exclusive domain of the human individuals who inhabit it. It is a clear indication of the personification of the state by Putin, for whom the state is the ultimate value, an object of worship and veneration. By paying lip service to democracy he conceals the fact that his ideal of a strong state inevitably clashes with the democratic freedoms of the citizens. He expects Russian citizens not to hamper the expansion of state power by political dissension (e.g., by voting for political parties that propose an alternative to Putin’s program). Instead they should remain unified and stand—as one bloc—behind the leader whose supreme task it is to enhance the power of the state, which is the incarnation of the mythical Fatherland (with a capital F). Therefore Putin continuously stresses the necessity of consensus building.

How important consensus and patriotism are for him is further clarified in the address read by him six months later on the occasion of the combined session of the Duma and the Federation Council.^[30] In this text he stressed again “that the growth of society is unthinkable without consensus on common goals. And these goals are not only material. No less important are spiritual and moral goals. It is the patriotism, which is characteristic for our people, the cultural traditions, common historical memory, which strengthen the unity of Russia.”^[31] In Putin’s exaltation of a strong state and in his emphasis on national consensus building we find a striking resemblance with Mussolini’s Italy. Like Putin, Mussolini wanted to overcome the internal divisions in the population and to build a national consensus around himself, Il Duce, who was the incarnation of a unified people. Only in this way did he think he would be able to build a strong, militarized, and centralized Italian state. It led in Italy to the suppression of political parties, the abolition of the free press, the persecution of political adversaries, and the introduction of a one-party state.

Apart from this emphasis on consensus building and the exaltation of state power, there is, furthermore, a third ingredient in Putin’s text that reminds one of Mussolini’s Italy. Two days before his appointment to acting president, Putin said: “Today we find the key for a rebirth and resurrection of Russia in the sphere of government and politics. Russia needs a strong and powerful government and must have this.”^[32] In his address six months later, he spoke of “a new Russia” and “the beginning of a new spiritual elevation.”^[33] Here we clearly recognize the palingenetic ingredient of a theory of national rebirth, which, according to Roger Griffin, is a fundamental element of fascist ideologies.^[34] Curiously enough one can observe a parallel between the positions not only of Putin and Mussolini, but also of Putin and Stalin. According to Aleksandr Yeliseev, “It must be said that neither socialism, nor even the state were in themselves values for him [Stalin]. The leader of the USSR considered them instruments necessary to guarantee what was most important—national independence. . . . Socialism, in Stalin’s thinking, had to overcome the class divisions inside the nation and make her monolithic and unified in face of all possible foreign challenges.”^[35] It is easy to recognize here Putin’s derzhavnost (great power status) and his stress on internal consensus. In the concept of “sovereign democracy” we find the same emphasis on national independence.

United Russia’s Electoral Success: A CPSU Effect?

In 2004 United Russia, the “Presidential Party,” had only one task: to reassure the reelection of Putin as president. Although it was the Presidential Party, Putin was not a member. It was a huge bureaucratic apparatus in the service of the president. The party soon became a victim of its own success. After Putin’s reelection in 2004 there was a great influx of new members—especially from amongst bureaucrats, civil servants, and regional leaders, who rallied to “the party of power”—just as they had done before, in Soviet times, when they adhered to the CPSU (though at that time the CPSU was the only choice). This “CPSU effect” had three consequences:

First, a majority of the new members was less driven by ideological considerations than by career prospects.