Leonid Luks, “Die politisch-religiöse ‘Sendung’ Russlands,” in
38.
V. F. Zalevsky, “Chto takoe Soyuz Russkogo Naroda i dlya chego on nuzhen?” Excerpts published in Golczewski and Pickhan,
39.
“Resolution of the ‘Section for the Struggle against Jewish Supremacy’ of the Congress of the Union of the Russian People in Nizhny Novgorod, November 1915,” in Golczewski and Pickhan,
40.
V. Ivanovich, ed.,
41.
Ivanovich,
42.
Ivanovich,
43.
Cf. Walter Laqueur,
44.
Laqueur,
45.
Laqueur,
46.
Stepan Shevyrev, 1841, “Vzglyad Russkogo na sovremennoe obrazovanie Evropy” (A Russian’s View of the Contemporary Development of Europe). In Golczewski and Pickhan,
47.
Nikolay Danilevsky, “Rossiya i Evropa” (Russia and Europe), in Golczewski and Pickhan,
48.
Arendt,
49.
Quoted in Arendt,
50.
Arendt,
51.
Galbraith,
52.
According to Yegor Gaidar, “Russia is unique in restoring a failed empire, which it did in the period 1918–22. This required an unprecedented use of force and violence. But that was not the only factor in the Bolshevik’s success. Messianic Communist ideology shifted the center of political conflict from a confrontation between ethnic groups to a struggle among social classes. That struggle garnered support from people in the non-Russian regions, who fought for a new social order that would open the way to a brilliant future, and played a large role in forming the Soviet Union within borders resembling those of the Russian Empire.” (Yegor Gaidar,
53.
Cf. Robert Service,
54.
Joseph A. Schumpeter,
55.
Schumpeter,
56.
On the devastating consequences of the purges, not only for the general population, but also for the communist elite, George Kennan wrote: “And the great old names of communism had not died alone. With them had gone a full 75 percent of the governing class of the country, a similar proportion of the leading intelligentsia, and over half of the higher officers’ corps of the Red army.” (George F. Kennan, “Russia: Seven Years Later,” Annex to George Kennan,
57.
Arendt,
58.
Kennan,
59.
Kennan,