It was only in the extreme south that offensive operations were still in active progress. The Southern Army Group, with II French Corps, II German Corps and about a division of Austrian troops, all under French command, and a heavy concentration of Allied tactical air forces in support, had crossed a start-line between Nurnberg and Munchen on 17 August in an advance directed on Pilsen. It had moved into Czechoslovakia on the 20th and was now making slow but steady progress. Of the troops opposing it none were Czechoslovak. Instead, SOUTHAG was now facing Soviet divisions out of 8 Guards Army and the Thirty-eighth Army from the Carpathian Military District.

On 21 August the southern advance was brought to a halt, at least for the time being, with its left flank, where II German Corps was deployed, south-west of Cheb. It has since become clear that the Central Group of Soviet Forces was concerned at the possibility of invasion of the GDR from the south and was under orders to resist it strongly if it came. It can also be safely claimed that the forward thrust of the Southern Army Group threw the operations of the Warsaw Pact in the Central Region of NATO considerably off-balance and thus helped to expedite its withdrawal in the northern plain.

Three momentous weeks had passed since that morning of 4 August when the world woke up to find itself once more with a major war on its hands. Only a pocket, if an important one, of Federal territory was still in the enemy’s hands. Though still very much at war the Federal Republic was able to look cautiously around and make a first assessment of the damage. Bremen was in ruins. Hannover was very badly damaged too, particularly on the east and south. Probably on account of the speed of the action the damage in other cities was not as great. Kassel, Nurnberg and Munchen had all suffered, and the great cities of the Rhineland had not been spared, though the spire of Koln cathedral had again surprisingly survived. But though the future was obscure and peace was not yet in sight, the worst seemed to have been averted, for the time being at least. The invasion of the Federal Republic of Germany by the Warsaw Pact had failed and the Atlantic Alliance had survived.

CHAPTER 22: Home Fires: The Domestic Scene in a Televisual Society

Hostilities had opened in Europe after a period in which every country in the Western Alliance had, to some degree or another and each according to its own particular needs and inclinations, done something to offset the result of years of general public disregard of the possibility of war.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the country most exposed, it had been necessary to move with circumspection. The inescapable requirement to make some provision for the evacuation of forward areas near the border with East Germany, where early fighting would be sharpest, and the need to take account of refugee movement flooding westwards, had to be met in such a way as not to diminish confidence in the policy of forward defence or in the protection given by NATO. Carefully and unobtrusively a great deal had been done. Arrangements for the evacuation of children and the provision of emergency stand-by services in depth were generally allowed to be not incompatible with an official policy which encouraged people to stay where they were in a war emergency. There was realistic, discreet and thorough planning for what was to be done if they failed to do so. The provision for the handling of a very big flow of population from the forward areas, much of it panic-stricken under air attack, for its marshalling, guidance, reception, dispersion and maintenance, was both extensive and sound. The development of the Territorial Army, which with its three Territorial commands of five military districts had made impressive progress from the late seventies onwards, furnished an invaluable supporting structure for the operation of emergency services. Its communications, engineer, police and service units, working in close harmony at Federal and Land level with civil and paramilitary border police, all under a staff and command system reflecting the usual efficiency of German military practice, proved of inestimable value. In the same years, civil defence measures — including some provision of shelters, emergency stores of food and medical supplies, hardened stand-by communications and sources of power — had also made progress. A more generous financial provision in Federal and Land budgets in the previous five years was well justified in the event.

In France there was less inclination to provide for civil defence than in the FRG. The argument was freely used that to do so would only diminish confidence in the deterrent effect of the country’s preparedness to defend itself (which included a built-in nuclear capability under national control). It certainly saved the French government a good deal of money.