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Western attempts to redress this imbalance by developing a tactical nuclear weapon with reduced and more transient fallout — the so-called “neutron bomb” (actually an artillery shell) were met by a massive worldwide propaganda campaign, centering on an incidental feature of the weapon, its lack of destruction of physical structures. That it would “kill people but not destroy property” became the theme of Soviet propaganda, echoed in the West, creating the impression that this demonstrated the capitalist mentality of concern for things rather than people. That the Soviets would argue this way is unsurprising, but that it should find such a responsive echo on the political left in Western countries — especially on a matter of national survival rather than political ideology — proved politically decisive. Antineutron “bomb” demonstrations swept across the Western world, and at the eleventh hour in the NATO negotiations, the American President withdrew plans for this tactical weapon, whose chief military characteristic was that it equalized defensive forces with offensive forces by not requiring defensive forces to destroy their own civilians to repel an invader. Existing tactical nuclear weapons, for example, would kill an estimated five million civilians in West Germany alone if used to repel an invader.²⁴⁹ The credibility of such a weapon as a deterrent could be discounted in advance by any invader, aware that it could literally hurt defenders worse than it would hurt an invading army. That emotional or ideological predispositions should influence decisions of this grim magnitude is an indication of the greater political as well as military vulnerability of the West. Such political reactions on the political left in Europe were far stronger than in the United States, the left itself being stronger in Western Europe. In America, the leading liberal spokesman, Senator Hubert Humphrey, threw his support behind the weapon.²⁵⁰ Western governments were apparently also in favor of the weapon, but often more so privately than publicly, given the political furor.²⁵¹

How did the present military imbalance develop, given the initial Western predominance? Quite simply by political decisions to trade off defense spending for domestic welfare programs. In 1952 military expenditures were 66 percent of the federal budget, but this declined to 24 percent by 1977 while social welfare expenditures rose from 17 percent to 50 percent over the same span.²⁵² Inflationary dollar figures maintain the political illusion that defense spending is rising, but in constant purchasing power terms military expenditures in the United States declined not only relatively but absolutely. Moreover, much of today’s military spending represents simply higher pay for military personnel — a fourfold increase in cost per soldier since 1952²⁵³ — rather than for weapons. More than half of all current American military expenditures are for personnel costs. The Soviet government has maintained and increased its military expenditures as the United States has reduced its. In short, the relative decline of American military power has been largely self-imposed, and “arms race” talk simply ignores the Soviet military buildup that has proceeded while American military resources were being diverted to social programs.

There is a striking parallel here with the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. In its early years the Romans “preserved the peace by a constant preparedness for war.”²⁵⁴ Their soldiers were rigorously trained²⁵⁵ and carried heavy armor and weaponry,²⁵⁶ and were commanded by the Roman aristocracy and led in battle by emperors.²⁵⁷ Their morale was supported by the pride of being Roman.²⁵⁸ Later, discipline relaxed,²⁵⁹ and the soldiers carried less armor and weaponry, as a result of their complaints about carrying burdens that had been carried in earlier generations.²⁶⁰ They were defeated by barbarian armies smaller than other barbarian armies that had been routed by Roman legions in earlier times.²⁶¹ Behind the self-weakening of Rome lay forces similar to those at work today in the United States and in the Western world at large: internal divisiveness²⁶² and demoralization,²⁶³ rising welfare expenditures,²⁶⁴ a growing and stifling bureaucracy²⁶⁵ — and a rising political influence of intellectuals.²⁶⁶ In Rome, as in later Western countries, both the zealotry and the power were concentrated precisely in those particular intellectuals who dealt in nonverifiable theories — religious theories in the case of Rome; “social justice” in the contemporary West.